But here will occur the common objection, that so many stumble at: “How doth it consist with the justice and goodness of God, that the posterity of Adam should suffer for his sin, the innocent be punished for the guilty?” Very well, if keeping one from what he has no right to, be called a punishment, the state of immortality, in paradise, is not due to the posterity of Adam, more than to any other creature. Nay, if God afford them a temporary, mortal life, it is his gift, they owe it to his bounty, they could not claim it as their right, nor does he injure them when he takes it from them. Had he taken from mankind any thing that was their right, or did he put men in a state of misery, worse than not being, without any fault or demerit of their own, this, indeed, would be hard to reconcile with the notion we have of justice, and much more with the goodness, and other attributes of the supreme Being, which he has declared of himself, and reason, as well as revelation, must acknowledge to be in him, unless we will confound good and evil, God and Satan. That such a state of extreme, irremediable torment is worse than no being at all, if every one’s own sense did not determine against the vain philosophy, and foolish metaphysics of some men, yet our Savior’s peremptory decision (Mat. 26:24) has put it past doubt, that one may be in such an estate, that it had been better for him not to have been born. But that such a temporary life, as we now have, with all its frailties and ordinary miseries, is better than no being, is evident, by the high value we put upon it ourselves. And therefore, though all die in Adam, yet none are truly punished, but for their own deeds.
John Locke, The Reasonableness of Christianity, σελ. 7.